Evaluating the Poverty Impact of Programme Aid by Addison, Tony
lt is probably neither possible nor neces-
sary to measure aid to poverty reduction
down to the last dollar. But if a common
sense basis for comparing efforts on aid to
the poor can be generally agreed, it will
reduce disagreements among the donor
community over how much aid is going to
the poorest ... We urge development min-
isters to ... set a timetable for agreement on
and adoption of a common methodology
for measuring aid to basic needs and
poorer income groups.
ICVAlEurostep/Actionaid, 1995, The Reality
of Aid 95: An Independent Review of
International Aid, London, Earthscan.
1 Introduction1
There is now considerable agreement that poverty
reduction should be one of the principal objectives
of both project and programme aid. To ensure that
programme aid helps poor people, we must evalu-
ate its effectiveness. To do this, we must know its
poverty impact. That impact is two-fold and works
through the programme's transfer of resources to
the recipient country and through the policy
changes which are conditionalities on the loan or
grant. This is an exceptionally challenging task.
Evaluating the poverty impact of project aid is dif-
ficult enough, but programme aid raises even more
questions (OECDIIADB 1989). A short article such
as this cannot hope to provide definitive answers.
However, it can help in building a framework
through which to seek out the answers.
According to OECD guidelines, aid is classified as
programme aid if it supports the country's overall
development strategy, or one or more sectors,
rather than specific projects (OECD 1991).
Programme aid includes World Bank structural
adjustment credits and sector adjustment credits as
well as loans and grants by bilateral donors.
This paper is a shorter version of a paper (Addison,
1996) prepared for a workshop on 'The Evaluation of
Balance of Payments Support' held at the Institute of
Social Studies, The Hague 11-13 October 1995,
sponsored by the Swedish International Development
Authority (SIDA). The preparation of this paper was
greatly helped by discussion with Aiden Cox, Michael
Foster, John Healey, Tony Killick, Finn Tarp, John bye,
Kevin Watkins, and Howard White together with partici-
pants at the ISS conference. The usual disclaimers apply
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Programme aid evolved to finance the balance of
payments deficits of developing countries, an
urgent need which cannot be met by traditional
project aid (Cassen 1994; White 1996b). The con-
ditionalities which are usually attached to pro-
gramme aid include: the liberalization of foreign
exchange allocation and currency devaluation;
tighter fiscal and monetary policies; reallocations
within public expenditures; trade and industrial
reforms; and agricultural policy reform (Mosley et
al. 1991; White 1996b). Papers elsewhere in this
issue of the IDS Bulletin provide more detail of the
various programmes and policies.
2 A Framework for Evaluating the
Poverty Impact of Programme Aid
The first task in evaluating the poverty impact of
either programme or project aid is to identify in
detail the channels through which it affects poor
people. To do this it is useful to make a distinction
between the intermediate and final objectives of
the aid. This distinction is best clarified by consid-
ering an example from project aid, namely a water
project in a poor neighbourhood. The project's
intermediate objective is to improve the water sup-
ply The final objective is to improve health. A pro-
ject appraisal which sets out how the project's
activities will achieve the project's intermediate
objective, and how achievement of the intermediate
objective will achieve the final objective, provides
a strong foundation for subsequent evaluation. If
the project achieves its intermediate objective (the
water supply improves) then this suggests that the
poor may have benefited. But to be sure we must
collect information at the individual and household
levels to determine whether the final objective was
met (the health of poor people has improved).2
As in the case of project aid, the evaluation of pro-
gramme aid is greatly helped when its poverty
objectives (intermediate and final), and their link-
age, are clearly specified, and when information is
collected to verify the effects. How far are these two
conditions met for programme aid?
These days most bilateral and multi-lateral pro-
gramme aid documents cite the reduction of
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poverty alongside economic growth as the pro-
gramme's primary objectives. Donors are usually
clear about how their programme aid, in providing
budget support, will help to increase spending on
primary education and basic health services; these
intermediate objectives, and their relationship to
the aid instrument, are therefore reasonably well-
defined. If poverty data are available - a major
caveat - then the effectiveness of the programme aid
in financing basic social services and thereby
improving the literacy and health of the poor (final
objectives) can be evaluated in the ways discussed
in Section 5 below
Donors are not so clear about how programme aid
will improve the livelihoods of the poor. Donors
share the view that the resource transfer of pro-
gramme aid plus the attendant policy changes
increases economic growth and, one way or
another, growth is accompanied by poverty reduc-
tion. This is not untrue; growth in which the poor
participate is ultimately necessary for substantial
poverty reduction. But it is too often assumed that
programme aid will achieve substantial poverty
reduction, especially when the participation of the
poor in growth is already limited because they have
too little human capital and too few resources.
Take for instance an agricultural sector adjustment
credit - an important form of programme aid in SSA
- for which the liberalization of export crop mar-
keting is a condition. Such a credit should raise
agricultural growth by providing resources for agri-
cultural investment (in infrastructure for example),
and by improving the pricing and marketing of
export crops. The credit has potential for poverty
reduction when inefficient state marketing and low
producer prices have depressed farm income,
which has been the case in many sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries.
Given this potential it is tempting to assume, as
many adjustment credits do, that the liberalization
of export marketing (the intermediate objective)
will strongly reduce poverty. Whether poverty does
decline depends, however, on how far the poor par-
ticipate in the export sector (by producing export
crops themselves or as agricultural wage workers)
2 Small sample household surveys and participatory the appropriateness of each technique see Chambers
assessments are increasingly being used to do this. On (1994) and Salmen (1987).
and the extent to which their income rises (either
because they produce more or because labour
demand and wages rise). Given the constraints
under which poor people make their livelihoods it
cannot be assumed without investigation that the
adjustment credit will significantly achieve its final
objective (rural poverty reduction) simply if it
achieves its intermediate objective (marketing liber-
alization). This point applies especially to the
reduction of female poverty, since poor women are
constrained by household time burdens and by dis-
crimination in product, credit, and labour markets,
all of which reduce their ability to take advantage of
the new market opportunities offered by reform
(Elson 1991).
Unfortunately, much programme aid fails to address
these issues satisfactorily during its preparation.
That is, the mechanisms by which the benefits of
the resource transfer and policy changes are
expected to transmit themselves to the livelihoods
of poor people are not sufficiently identified, nor
are the constraints which can block or limit the
benefits. This makes subsequent evaluation of the
poverty impact very difficult.
For example, evaluations of the World Bank's
adjustment lending by its Operations Evaluation
Department are rarely able to reach any but the
most general conclusions about the poverty impact
of these loans. Usually they conclude that the poor
would have been worse off without the programme
(the 'counterfactual' to adjustment). While in many
cases this is true (but not for all the poor), the gap
in evaluation means that it is very difficult to dis-
cover how the programme's benefits for the poor
could be improved, and what additional project aid
is needed to increase those benefits.3 Such oppor-
tunities can only be properly identified if during the
programme's preparation clear poverty objectives
and mechanisms are identified enabling the evalua-
tor to assess how far the programme met, or fell
short of, its intermediate and final objectives.
The second of our two conditions for the satisfac-
tory evaluation of programme aid is the collection
In the case of our example of an agricultural sector
credit which improves price incentives project, assistance
to raise supply response among poor farmers can include
credit schemes targeted to poor smallholders in export-
crop regions, extension and research services to develop
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of poverty information. Donors frequently cite lack
of information as a reason why their evaluations of
programme aid do not produce more robust con-
clusions about poverty impacts. This is certainly a
problem, especially in Africa; statistical offices are
often under financed, resulting in infrequent sur-
veys, and insufficient poverty data.
But the lack of data is partly the result of a lack of
attention to poverty in programme preparation.
Activities to collect poverty information should be
included so that the programme's poverty impact
can be both monitored, and then subsequently
evaluated (Addison 1993). The collection of
poverty data should be seen as an integral activity of
programme aid, just as it is now seen as desirable to
make it an integral activity of projects. In a few
cases this is now occurring, although not yet in a
systematic way (see Norton et al. 1995 on Ghana
and World Bank 1994b on Zambia).
Inevitably the information needed to evaluate pro-
gramme aid will be more expensive and time con-
suming to collect than that for project aid. Instead
of household surveys covering the locality or region
in which the project is based, national household
surveys are needed to understand programme aid's
effects. Participatory assessments providing a
national coverage of communities, rather than
one or two in a project area, will also be necessary
To implement such large-scale information collec-
tion requires much more investment in national
capacities.
3 Import Support and Poverty
Reduction
In the 1980s many countries, especially in Africa,
initially responded to their balance of payments dif-
ficulties by tightening quantitative restrictions on
imports, in particular consumer goods. These
restrictions were increased over time, and extended
to imported inputs and capital goods as the policies
which undermined export incentives (particularly
currency overvaluation) remained unreformed, and
therefore the amount of foreign exchange available
export crops suitable for resource-poor regions, and
investment in economic infrastructure, especially
transport infrastructure. Each of these has a gender
dimension which must be identified to improve benefits
to poor rural women.
to the economy steadily declined (World Bank
1990).
The resulting reduction in the supply of imported
and domestically produced consumer goods led to
a rise in their price and, when price control was
imposed (a common policy response), supplies
shifted to parallel markets in which prices were
market determined but in which traders added a
price premium to cover the risks of illegal trade
(Roemer 1986). Loose monetary policy con-
tributed to the inflation of parallel market prices
and traders increasingly sold from 'under the
counter' rather than at controlled prices.
Consumers were rationed when attempting to buy
at controlled prices, and increasingly found goods
to be unavailable in parallel markets as their supply
fell with the intensification of quantitative restric-
tions. The same processes occurred in the markets
for inputs and capital goods. Tanzania prior to the
launch of reform in 1986 is a good example of this
decline.
Import support increases the availability of con-
sumer goods, inputs, and capital goods, and there-
fore poor people will be less rationed in markets.
At the same time as market rationing is reduced by
import support, policy reforms such as changes in
subsidies, trade policy, and devaluation will alter
the market prices that the poor face. This raises
further complications in assessing the overall
poverty impact of the aid. To disentangle these
effects it is necessary to assess the impact on the
poor as consumers; the impact on their agricultural
incomes, and on their employment opportunities
outside agriculture.
For poor consumers the main benefit of import
support is the reduction of rationing. At the same
time, policy reforms will change consumer prices,
sometimes adversely for the poor. For example a
subsidy may be withdrawn without being replaced
by targeted safety nets. Two sets of effects arise:
direct welfare effects (increased welfare from
increased choice) and health and nutrition effects
(changes in the availability and price of goods criti-
cal to health and nutrition). The latter are particu-
larly important in improving the welfare of women
and children. Regular surveys and participatory
assessments should monitor these effects (see sum-
mary matrix on p 32).
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If the markets serving poor people are neither effi-
cient nor competitive then the gains to them from
the increased availability of goods will be diluted.
Studies should monitor the market situation in
poor regions, and measures can then be taken to
improve market efficiency and competitiveness if
problems are found (see the summary matrix in
this article. Addison 1996, provides a more
detailed discussion). The availability of consumer
goods in poor areas is an intermediate indicator of
poverty trends. However, increased availability of
goods may not be accompanied by increased pur-
chases by the poor, especially when reforms raise
consumer prices. Therefore policy makers need
information at the household level to check
whether their final objective (poverty reduction) is
being achieved.
Programme aid's impact on agriculture is critical
given the incidence and depth of rural poverty in
most recipient countries. Agricultural policy
reforms, especially in marketing, alter the price
incentives facing poor smaliholders. Import sup-
port also reduces or eliminates rationing in agricul-
tural input markets. To understand the rural
poverty impacts the following analysis is necessary
(see summary matrix): the construction of indices
of real producer prices, and measures of the agri-
cultural terms of trade for each crop; models which
link up sector policies such as export pricing with
household welfare indicators such as income and
nutritional and health status (see for example Sahn
et al. 1992); successive household surveys to track
poverty over time; and participatory assessments in
selected communities, for example those for which
particular crops (and therefore particular marketing
reforms) are especially important for livelihoods
(Booth, et aI. 1993).
In reversing the rationing of agricultural inputs,
import support should improve food security
Benefits may include greater availability of critical
inputs in poor areas and for women farmers, and
increased crop diversification. Efficient input mar-
kets are necessary for these benefits to be realized.
The withdrawal of input subsidies and price
reforms may reduce input use by the poor. Small
surveys and participatory assessment implemented
during the reform process can provide information
sufficiently quickly to indicate any problems for
poor farmers and appropriate action can then be
taken (see for example von Braun, et al. 1990 on
The Gambia).
Programme aid will also affect the livelihoods of the
poor in non-agricultural activities such as manufac-
turing and services, in both the formal and informal
sectors. The foreign exchange inflow will enable
enterprises to obtain previously scarce imports of
inputs and capital equipment. This will benefit
small enterprises in the formal sector and informal
sector enterprises since foreign exchange licensing
usually discriminates against them and in favour of
large enterprises.
The increase in capacity utilization will raise
employment but the size of the increasewill depend
on how the labour market operates (Addison and
Demery 1993). This can be monitored using offi-
cial employment statistics for formal sector employ-
ment, and surveys and participatory assessments
for the informal sector. The restructuring of the for-
mal manufacturing sector will result from the liber-
alization of foreign exchange licensing, the
reduction of import protection, and the withdrawal
of subsidies. Some activities in the informal sector
may also be affected. The poverty impact of these
effects must also be monitored, and suitable project
assistance established to help the poor find new
employment.
4 Debt Relief And Poverty
Reduction
Inevitably, the growth of programme lending has
resulted in recipients accumulating large official
debts. The debt problems of the group of 32
'severely indebted low-income countries' (SILICs)
remain a major concern (Killick 1995, Oxfam
1996). Some bilateral debt has now been. written
off. SILICs continue to service their multilateral
debts, and the IMP and the World Bank have been
reluctant to write-off multilateral debt, although
new initiatives on multi-lateral debt reduction were
discussed at the spring (1996) meeting of the
IMFIWorld Bank development committee (ODI
1995). Debt relief is a form of programme aid.
As a group, the SILICs owe most of their long-term
debt to the bilateral and multilateral creditors
(although some also have large commercial foreign
debts). Debt depresses private investment and
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therefore growth (the debt-overhang problem), and
export earnings may be insufficient to service the
debt (the cashflow problem). The debt-overhang
problem is more important than the cashflow prob-
lem for countries receiving programme aid (World
Bank 1994a). Some bilateral loans have been con-
verted retrospectively into grants, thereby providing
debt relief. While this is welcome, the relief of
bilateral debt does not usually represent a transfer
of new resources, since much of the debt is unlikely
to be repaid in current circumstances. Relief of
multilateral debt will provide new resources
because new bilateral grants will no longer be used
to service multilateral debt as presently occurs.
Such additional resources will be important in
restoring growth in the SILICs (Oxfam 1996).
If a country has a cashflow problem, debt-relief
should have the same poverty effects as the resource
transfer in import support, and the poverty impact
can be monitored in the same way In the case of an
economy with a large debt-stock (i.e. a large debt-
overhang problem), there may be considerable
uncertainty among investors about economic
prospects, making it very difficult for governments
to convince the private sector of the 'credibility' of
policy changes. Because much of the effect of debt-
overhang depends on the expectations of investors,
it is difficult to predict its macroeconomic effect,
and therefore the impact on poverty of debt relief.
If the reduction of debt-overhang results in a more
stable macroeconomic environment, including bet-
ter producer price incentives, then smallholder
investment and income will grow Given Africa's
very low savings rate, inward investment is essential
for economic growth and employment growth, and
foreign investment is deterred by debt overhang.
Debt-relief can have a fiscal effect when it reduces
government interest payments, thereby facilitating
increased budget allocations to pro-poor expendi-
tures.
5 Countervalue Funds, Public
Expenditures And Poverty
Programme aid provides countervalue funds. These
funds can be transferred to the budget either with
no conditions as to their use or with the donor
imposing conditionality They can also be used for
off-budget expenditures. Donors now pay closer
attention to the use of countervalue funds, and
therefore the overall structure and management of
public expenditures in recipient countries. This is
for two reasons. First, whether the reform of incen-
tive policies yields growth depends upon the econ-
omy's supply response, especially in smallholder
agriculture, and therefore on public investment in
infrastructure. Second, it is widely agreed that
expanding access to basic health services, primary
education (especially for girls), and safe water and
sanitation together with infrastructure and services
serving smaliholder agriculture, particularly women
farmers and resource poor regions, are all crucial to
poverty reduction, and all of these require increased
budget allocations (Lipton and Maxwell 1992).
To ensure that countervalue funds are supporting
pro-poor priorities, the poverty impact of public
expenditures must be assessed. A first approach is
to focus on the shares and levels of public spending
on pro-poor services (see summary matrix). The
public accounts can show whether these expendi-
tures are increasing under the influence of counter-
value funds and conditionality World Bank Public
Expenditure Reviews (FERs) are the traditional
means for such comprehensive analysis, and these
are now moving towards a more explicit poverty
focus (see for example, World Bank 1994c).
Unfortunately, the budget data are often of very
poor quality and an improvement in government
accounting and auditing is important from a
poverty perspective (Toye and Jackson 1996).
Moreover, off-budget programmes supported by
donors and NGOs can make it difficult to accurately
assess the relative contribution of donors and the
government in funding pro-poor services.
While evaluation using budget data is essential, it
has the drawback that in observing an increase in
spending on pro-poor infrastructure and services
we cannot assume that the poor necessarily use
these services significantly Budget data only pro-
vides an indicator of whether an intermediate
objective (to increase pro-poor spending) is being
met. Participatory and beneficiary assessment
together with household surveys must be used to
check that expenditures are actually benefiting the
poor (the final objective). These techniques are
valuable in increasing the focus of PERS on poverty
and gender (see for example Devereux and Eiseb
1994). The techniques of benefit incidence
analysis can be applied using household data to
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determine the incidence of public spending across
income groups (van de Walle and Nead 1995). A
poverty information system which monitors some
key and easily collectable indicators over time
provides a warning of emerging problems in the
allocation of public money These indicators can
include, for example, primary school enrolment
rates in poor regions and the availability of key
drugs in clinics in poor urban neighbourhoods.
6 Conclusions
To maximize the benefits of programme aid to the
poor more attention must be given to poverty dur-
ing programme preparation. Specifically, it is not
enough to assume that programme aid will raise
growth, and that the poor have enough productive
assets and market access to achieve a level of par-
ticipation in growth which will reduce their poverty
substantially Closer attention in programme prepa-
ration to the ways in which programme aid achieves
its intermediate objectives, and much closer atten-
tion to the linkages between intermediate and final
objectives, are essential if we are to understand how
the livelihoods of the poor can benefit from both
the resource transfer of programme aid and the
attached policy conditionality
A key priority must be to establish more processes
for collecting poverty information: this implies
building national capacities in the techniques of
household surveys and participatory assessment.
Methods for gathering information must be flexible
to cope with a wide variety of country situations
(what is possible for Indonesia's statistical office is
not at present possible in Mali's) and be able to
deliver information in a timely manner before it
becomes out of date for policy purposes. lt is
equally important to build national capacities for
using data to analyse the linkages between pro-
gramme aid and poverty In particular, data col-
lected by national statistical offices must be freely
available so that independent researchers can verify
what is happening to the poor.
If these steps are taken during programme prepara-
tion then the evaluation of programme aid can
move beyond the present situation in which we
know too little about the impact, and in which it is
very difficult to say whether the programme has
achieved its poverty reduction objective. On this
basis, the poverty focus of future programmes can
be further improved, and project aid can be used
more effectively to increase the participation of the
poor in growth.
The lack of attention to poverty by donors in the
preparation of their programmes is surprising given
that it leaves so much scope for criticism of aid and
its policy conditionality Criticism of economic
reform in Africa might be less ferocious if donors
attached to each programme clear and detailed
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Summary matrix: evaluating the poverty impact of programme aid
Import Support
Consumer Effects
(direct welfare effects,
and health
and nutrition effects)
Agricultural Income
Effects
(policy reforms and
reduced rationing of
agricultural inputs)
Evaluation Using Intermediate
Objectives (market changes
and infrastructure investment)
Market surveys to check
availability of consumer goods in
rural areas and poor urban
neighbourhoods and efficiency
of markets
Market surveys to check
availability and pricing of goods
important to health and nutrition
following reduced foreign
exchange rationing
Construction of indices of real
producer prices (eg ratio farm-
gate price to world price for
exportables) to track market
impact of reform
Market surveys of availability of
agricultural inputs and capital
equipment following reduced
foreign exchange rationing and
efficiency of market following
liberalization
Evaluation Using Final
Objectives (Poverty Reduction
and Human Development)
Participatory assessment using
recall data of availability of
goods
Questions on the availability of
goods in national household
surveys and in smaller surveys
focused on remote rural regions
Investigation using participatory
data and survey data of impact
on health and nutrition
(especially of women and
children) of changes in the
availability and pricing of
consumer goods
Models linking sector policies
with household welfare
outcomes
(and small surveys to collect
data)
Successive national household
surveys for data panel and
multi-variate analysis of impact
over time
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Non-Agricultural
Employment Effects
(reduced foreign
exchange rationing for
manufacturing inputs
and trade and industrial
policy reforms)
Debt Relief
Cashflow Effect
(debt-relief reduces
foreign exchange
rationing)
Debt-Overhang Effect
(debt relief removes
depressing effect of
debt-overhang on
investment)
Evaluation Using Intermediate
Objectives (market changes
and infrastructure investment)
Trends in formal-sector
manufacturing output and
employment (up-grade national
employment statistics eg.
gender decomposition of
employment trends)
Data on capital-labour ratios in
the formal sector
Collect data on trends in output
and employment in informal
sector (enterprise surveys)
Market surveys of availability of
inputs and equipment to
informal sector following
removal of foreign exchange
licensing.
Evaluation same as for import
support
Expectations of investors
regarding economic prospects
and evidence of increased
investment (upgrade national
investment statistics)
Employment trends in
manufacturing and agriculture
(evidence of increase in labour
demand as investment rises)
Evaluation Using Final
Objectives (Poverty Reduction
& Human Development)
Participatory assessments in
selected communities (eg. those
affected by particular reforms)
Information collection (using
household surveys and
participatory assessment) and
feed-back system to check
poverty impact of liberalization
on availability and pricing of
inputs
Surveys of formal
manufacturing enterprises to
determine incomes of formal-
sector workers (ie poor or not)
National household surveys with
questions on formal and
informal employment status
which can be correlated with
household income
(successive surveys can track
trends)
City specific surveys of informal
sector households and working
of city labour market
Participatory assessment to
determine community impacts
and impact on women micro-
entrepreneurs
Evaluation same as for import
support
Surveys of new enterprises
which arose after debt-relief to
check incomes of workers
Trends in poverty using
national household surveys
before and after debt relief
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Summary matrix: evaluating the poverty impact of programme aid (cont.)
Countervalue Funds
and Public
Expenditures
(reallocations of public
spending towards pro-
poor expenditures)
Evaluation Using Intermediate
Objectives (market changes
and infrastructure investment)
Expansion of social-sector and
other pro-poor spending
following reduction of interest
payments on government
official debt (see below on
countervalue funds, public
expenditures and poverty)
Use public accounts data to
determine shares and levels of
spending on pro-poor
expenditure items (basic health
services, primary education,
safe water and sanitation,
infrastructure and services for
smallholders, road
infrastructure and power
supplies to poor urban
neighbourhoods)
Use public accounts data to
evaluate whether spending on
pro-poor expenditures has
shifted in proportion to provision
of countervalue funds (if not
check budgetary management
etc to verify problems).
Increase poverty (and gender
focus) of PERs and bring off-
budget spending into budget to
clarify contribution of donors
versus government to pro-poor
spending
Evaluation Using Final
Objectives (Poverty Reduction
& Human Development)
Evidence from household
surveys and participatory
assessments of increases in
household welfare indicators
following expansion social
sector spending following debt
relief
Participatory and beneficiary
assessment to determine views
of poor communities regarding
their problems in accessing
public services (education,
health-care etc), and reasons
(cost, travel time etc).
Community level surveys to
check provision of infrastructure
and services
National household surveys to
calculate the incidence across
income groups of public
spending.
Successive national household
surveys can show how the
incidence of public spending
changes over time during the
provision of programme aid.
Track to establish whether
public spending is becoming
more progressive or regressive
over time.
Build poverty information
system to monitor key
indicators (maternal and child
health etc) and alert
governments and donors to
problems
